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Summary 
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the 
incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the 
complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, 
industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This result is in contrast with earlier 
contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between 
stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. A key finding of the paper is that state-
owned enterprises may be used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict 
between individual and collective incentives for R&D collaboration. 
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Abstract
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives
for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network,
where each ￿rm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-pro￿t maximizing
and e¢ cient. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where
under strong market rivalry a con￿ ict between stable and e¢ cient networks is likely to
occur. A key ￿nding of the paper is that state-owned enterprises may be used as policy
instruments in tackling the potential con￿ ict between individual and collective incentives
for R&D collaboration.
Keywords: Networks, R&D collaboration, mixed oligopoly.
JEL Classi￿cation: C70, L13, L20, L31, L32, O31, D85.
1 Introduction
Inter-￿rm R&D partnerships are known for having played a crucial role in generating technol-
ogy advances and expanding the stock of available technological capabilities. The importance
of R&D partnerships was re￿ ected at the growth in partnering activity of the high-tech phar-
maceutical biotechnology industry (Hagedoorn, 2002; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006). In the
initial period of 1975-1980, large pharmaceutical companies expanded their activity to the ￿eld
of biotechnology through a small number of alliances with start-up biotechnology companies.
For the next two decades, many new research agreements were annually established, resulting in
much denser and well-connected networks, with nearly all ￿rms being connected to each other.1
An important aspect of innovation process is that it involves both private and public ￿rms.
Mixed oligopoly is a very common form of market in Europe and in the former Soviet Bloc
countries, following the introduction of competition into traditional state monopolies (White,
2002). To take one example, Norway￿ s current portfolio includes a variety of R&D projects
aimed at the development of fuel cells and related hydrogen technologies. These projects are
organised as research consortia of R&D intensive ￿rms, with participation of state-owned ￿rms
1For instance, during the period 1990-1994, around 300 companies established new research partnerships and
during the second half of the 1990s, the number grew even larger to around 600 ￿rms (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn,
2006).
1such as Statoil. The development of fuel cells and hydrogen technologies is related to energy-
oriented R&D projects within the EU and is indeed highly subsidized (5th and 6th Framework
Programs).2
Motivated by the recent trends in R&D partnering activity we develop a model of endoge-
nous network formation to study the incentives for bilateral collaborations. Our aim is to
investigate the role of a public ￿rm in in￿ uencing the structure of collaborations, and the po-
tential implications this might have on the industry structure and performance. In particular,
we are primarily interested in the following questions:
(i) What are the incentives of competing ￿rms that pursue e¢ ciency-enhancing innovations
to establish collaborative alliances for the purpose of developing and sharing new knowledge?
What is the architecture of the emerging ￿incentive-compatible￿networks?
(ii) How does the presence of a state-owned company a⁄ect the structure of the ￿incentive-
compatible￿networks; and, are individual incentives to form collaborations adequate from a
social welfare point of view?
To answer these questions we consider a mixed oligopoly with a public and two private
￿rms. In the ￿rst stage, prior to competing in the product market, ￿rms create collaborative
ties. The purpose of collaborative agreements is the sharing of technological know-how on a
cost reducing technology within the context of joint research projects. This framework naturally
translates into various types of relationships, entailing di⁄erent opportunities for inter-partner
learning. In the second stage, the government (or regulator) commits to a level of R&D subsidy
to maximize overall welfare. In the third stage, ￿rms choose a non-cooperative level of R&D
e⁄ort. The selection of R&D e⁄orts together with the mode of knowledge transmission, and the
type of research network where ￿rms are embedded, determine the e⁄ective production costs.
Finally, ￿rms compete in the market of a homogeneous good by setting quantities.
Our ￿rst result concerns the relationship between the level of collaboration and individual
R&D e⁄ort. We ￿nd that R&D e⁄ort is increasing in the number of collaborative alliances,
and so it is maximized under the complete network. To see intuitively why this happens from
the private ￿rms￿perspective,3 notice that the public ￿rm is an aggressive competitor since it
is typically willing to expand its output more than a private ￿rm ￿and thus it reduces the
available rents in the product market. It follows that a private ￿rm can potentially increase
its payo⁄ by exerting a stronger R&D e⁄ort in order to counter the negative e⁄ects resulting
from the public ￿rm￿ s maximizing behaviour. In doing so, private ￿rms may also establish
new collaboration ties. This pattern typically contrasts with the case that all ￿rms are private
2The public organisation Enova was established in 2002 with main aim to subsidize environmentally clean
energy technologies. In addition, the Research Council of Norway is responsible for directing public funds towards
R&D, which form part of the budgets of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Public funding to R&D for fuel
cells and hydrogen technologies was in 2001 approximately US$ 18 millions (Godł et al., 2003)
3This is the most interesting case since from the viewpoint of the public ￿rm an increase in the number of
collaborative ties increases social returns to R&D, and this leads to stronger R&D e⁄ort.
2where the general rule seems to be that an increase in the level of collaborative activity reduces
individual R&D e⁄ort due to the associated incentives for free-riding.
Our next result pertains to the incentives of ￿rms to form collaborative alliances. We show
that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network.4 Thus, it appears that in the
empty, partial and star networks ￿rms that are not connected have an incentive to establish
a new collaboration. This is in contrast with a purely private market where the partially
connected network remains stable for small spillovers and no subsidies to R&D (Goyal and
Moraga-GonzÆlez, 2001). When R&D is subsidised, the partially connected network is stable
for intermediate spillovers (Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). Moreover, the complete network
among private ￿rms is always pairwise stable, although it is never stable if coalitional deviations
are allowed. Under certain circumstances, this makes the partially connected network the unique
strongly stable network.
Contrary to that we ￿nd that the complete network is the unique strongly stable network.
Intuitively, the public ￿rm typically produces more than a private ￿rm. This implies that
additional R&D collaborations by private ￿rms may serve the purpose of diminishing the com-
petitive advantage of the public ￿rm, and consequently, increasing private ￿rms￿pro￿t. This
in turn destabilizes the partially connected networks, making the complete network uniquely
pairwise and strongly stable. Thus, our result can be interpreted in the following natural way:
the stability of the complete network is merely due to the public ￿rm￿ s maximizing behaviour,
which leaves a small residual demand to the private ￿rms, rather than the outcome of any
enhancing e⁄ect of public ownership on the private ￿rms￿incentives to collaborate.
We then examine the di⁄erent networks from an e¢ ciency standpoint. We ￿nd that the
complete network is the unique e¢ cient network. This result carries an important message: it
suggests that the presence of a public ￿rm among the industry participants reconciles individual
incentives to form collaborations with the collective ones. Thus, a public ￿rm may potentially
be used as a policy instrument in regulating innovative activity. By contrast, when a network
is formed among private ￿rms only, this may give rise to a con￿ ict between stability and social
welfare, although the con￿ ict is considerably reduced when the government can subsidize R&D.
No subsidies con￿ ict i⁄ ￿ > ^ ￿
R&D subsidies con￿ ict i⁄ ￿ = 2 (￿,￿)
R&D subsidies and state-owned ￿rm no con￿ ict￿
Table 1: Potential con￿ ict between stable and e¢ cient networks (￿new result)
The well known study by Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2001) and the literature it has stim-
ulated on R&D collaboration networks analyse the incentives for inter-￿rm collaboration and
the structure of the emerging ￿incentive-compatible￿networks.5 Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez
4As we will see, this result is independent of the spillover rate or the mode of knowledge transmission.
5Goyal and Joshi (2003) studied networks of collaboration in oligopoly with private ￿rms where the formation
of a link between two ￿rms incurs a ￿xed cost and leads to an exogenously speci￿ed reduction in the marginal
costs.
3(2001) analysed both the cases of symmetric networks with an arbitrary number of horizontally
related ￿rms, and the case of three-￿rm (asymmetric) networks. Since this study, it has been
widely accepted that a con￿ ict between individual incentives to form R&D alliances and social
welfare is likely to occur. Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2001) suggested that a con￿ ict is likely
to arise when public spillovers are not too small. More recently, Song and Vannetelbosch (2007)
investigated the possibility of reconciling private incentives for collaboration with the collective
ones by means of R&D subsidization policies. Considering a model of three ￿rms located in
di⁄erent countries, and selling a (homogeneous) good in an internationally integrated product
market, they showed that the likelihood of such a con￿ ict is considerably reduced to the cases
of very small or quite large spillovers. In addition, governments should be allowed to subsidize
R&D whenever spillovers are not very small.
The principal di⁄erences with our approach are the following. First, we examine the poten-
tial role of a public ￿rm as a policy instrument within a network of R&D collaboration. This is
a useful addition to the relevant literature since previous studies have entirely concentrated on
partnerships between ￿rms of private ownership. Second, we are interested to study networks
involving the transmission of both tacit and codi￿ed knowledge. Note that the aforementioned
studies focus on the framework of codi￿ed knowledge only. In that case spillovers from direct
collaborations are fully absorbed. Moreover, indirectly connected and unconnected ￿rms are
treated alike, since both receive the same public spillover. By contrast, in the present context
we assume that research knowledge may not be fully appropriated, and that the associated
spillovers depend on the distance between research partners. Indeed, spillovers from indirect
collaborations are always smaller than those arising from a direct relationship.6 In addition,
there is no spillover out￿ ow from any given network. This framework is more suitable to de-
scribe the transmission of both codi￿ed and tacit knowledge, and has been recently proposed by
Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2008).7 As remains to be seen, the presence
of a public ￿rm in fact in￿ uences the process of network formation independently of the mode
of knowledge transmission, and in turn shapes the market structure and industry performance.
The literature on R&D incentives in the context of a mixed oligopoly is relatively scarce. Del-
bono and Denicol￿ (1993) examined the role of a public ￿rm in regulating innovative activity in
a mixed duopoly with perfectly protected innovations. They showed that a welfare-maximizing
￿rm can alleviate the overinvestment problem in the private duopoly. More recently, Poyago-
Theotoky (1998) investigated the case of easy imitation in R&D, showing that most of the
results of Delbono and Denicol￿ (1993) can actually be reversed.8 Our approach is richer in the
6For example, each pair of the ￿rms i and j and j and k may have a collaborative tie, without the same being
necessarily true for the pair i and k. We will say that ￿rms i (j) and j (k) are directly connected and ￿rms i and
k are connected indirectly (see Mauleon et al., 2008). The distinction between direct and indirect collaborations
in￿ uences the process of knowledge transmission and in turn a⁄ects the extent of inter-partner learning.
7In the context of unionized labour markets, this paper investigated the relationship between union bargaining
power and R&D network architecture and found that the complete network is uniquely pairwise and strongly
stable under monopoly unions.
8Nett (1994) considered the case of a mixed duopoly with cost reducing innovation, and showed that the
4sense that the strategic e⁄ects for R&D are mediated through a network of R&D collaboration
in which the structure of the network and the place ￿rms occupy in it play an important role.
This in turn may give us a more comprehensive view of how research incentives are shaped in
the present context.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The next section contains
the results on the stability and e¢ ciency properties of R&D networks. Section 4 discusses
possible extensions, and ￿nally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of endogenous network formation. Firms create collaboration links to
transfer knowledge on a new technology which enhances their productive e¢ ciency, and hence,
lowers costs. We study the incentives for R&D collaboration, paying particular attention to
the form that strategic alliances can take, and then compare stable with e¢ cient networks. We
proceed ￿rst to develop the necessary terminology and de￿nitions.
Networks of collaboration. Let N = f0;1;2g be the set of ￿rms. The set comprises a
public ￿rm (indexed by i = 0) and 2 identical private ￿rms. The inverse demand function of the
homogeneous good produced by the ￿rms is P(Q) = a￿Q, where 0 ￿ Q < a and Q =
P
i2N qi.
We will say that any two members of N, i and j, are linked under the network g if fi;jg 2 g.
For simplicity, we write ij to represent the link fi;jg, so that ij 2 g implies that ￿rms i and j
maintain a collaboration link under network g. De￿ne a collaboration network as a collection
of such pairwise links f(ij)i;j2Ng. In any network g, nodes represent the ￿rms and each link
represents an R&D partnership. Firms can add or sever a link from a given network provided
that it is in their interest to do so.10 We have that g + ij is the network resulting from g if
￿rms i and j form a new link between them. Similarly, g ￿ij is the network resulting from the
deletion of the link between i and j.11 We will say that two ￿rms i and j are connected if and
only if there exists a sequence of ￿rms i1;:::;iK such that ikik+1 2 g for each k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g
with i1 = i and iK = j. Let Ni(g) be the set of links of ￿rm i in network g, and let G be the
set of all possible networks.
In the rest of the paper we concentrate on asymmetric networks. The advantage of this choice
of a set up is that it allows ￿rms to maintain a not necessarily equal number of connections.
This is particularly relevant due to the asymmetry resulting from the presence of a public ￿rm
among the industry participants. Hence, we have the following network architectures: (i) the
public ￿rm may opt for producing at a higher cost than the private ￿rm. Moreover, in some instances, welfare
can be higher in the private case compared to the mixed one.
9Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) have mentioned that the locus of innovation is not considered a ￿rm
as a single entity anymore. It is rather the network of collaboration in which the ￿rm belongs.
10The optimality of forming or severing a link from an existing network is conceptualised in terms of pro￿t for
the private ￿rms, whereas in terms of welfare (consumers surplus plus aggregate pro￿ts) for the public ￿rm (the
formal de￿nitions are presented below).
11Here the links are assumed to be ￿non directed￿ , that is ij = ji.
5complete network, gc, in which the level of collaborative activity is maximal, i.e. all ￿rms are
connected to each other; (ii) the star network, in which one ￿rm (￿hub￿ ) is connected with
two other (￿spokes￿ ), but the latter remain disconnected. Note that there are two cases to be
distinguished here: either the public ￿rm can be a hub or any of the private ￿rms. We call
the former public-hub star network, gs0, and the latter private-hub star network, gs. (iii) Next,
we have the partially connected network, in which any two ￿rms are connected while the third
￿rm is isolated. Under the partially connected network either two private ￿rms can maintain a
link or the public ￿rm can be linked with one private ￿rm. We call the former public partial
network, gp0, and the latter private partial network, gp. (iv) Finally, we have the empty network
(ge), in which the level of collaborative activity is minimal, i.e. there are no collaboration links.
With two private ￿rms and one public ￿rm eight network architectures are possible; however,





















































Figure 1: Six possible network architectures
R&D e⁄orts and spillovers. Given a network g, each ￿rm conducts R&D to reduce its
marginal cost. R&D e⁄ort is costly with cost represented by the quadratic function ￿(ei) = ￿e2
i,
￿ > 0; this re￿ ects diminishing returns to the level of R&D e⁄ort ei. For simplicity, we set ￿ = 1
which ensures non-negativity of all variables. The e⁄ective level of R&D is the total reduction in
a ￿rm￿ s marginal cost and has two components: the own research e⁄ort ei and the e⁄ort pro￿le of
￿rm i￿ s research partners fej;ekg; i 6= j 6= k: We assume that the extent of information leakage
or degree of spillovers bene￿t collaborating ￿rms at an exogenously given rate ￿, ￿ 2 (0;1]. The
rate of knowledge transmission, the spillover rate, is assumed to depend on the distance among
collaborating ￿rms. Like in Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2008), the distance
between two ￿rms i and j in a network g is speci￿ed by the number of links in the shortest path
between them. We denote by t(ij) the number of links in the shortest path between i and j, and
6we set t(ij) = 1 to denote the absence of a path between them. This de￿nition provides a clear
distinction between direct and indirect R&D relationships. Consequently, spillovers obtained
from direct collaborations are always larger than those obtained from indirect collaborations,
since t(ij) = 1 in the case of a direct relationship. Hence, given a network g and a collection of
R&D e⁄orts fei(g)gi2N, knowledge augments in the following fashion






), i 6= j 6= k: (1)
Payo⁄s. A network of collaboration is speci￿ed as a collection of pairwise links in which
the level of R&D e⁄ort and the extent of knowledge transmission depends on the place where
￿rms locate in a given network. Hence, a ￿rm￿ s total cost function depends on its own level of
output, qi, the level of e⁄ective R&D, Ei; and the architecture of the relevant network. The
production technology of ￿rm i operating in network g is of the form
Ci(qi;Ei;g) = (￿ c ￿ Ei(g))qi(g) + q2
i (g); i 2 N, a > ￿ c > 0. (2)
To avoid situations where the private ￿rms are driven out of the market altogether, we
have introduced a quadratic term in a ￿rm￿ s total cost function. This assumption re￿ ects
that the public ￿rm is ￿mildly￿ine¢ cient compared to the private ￿rms.12 If the public ￿rm
was very e¢ cient it would serve the entire market, and if it was too ine¢ cient this would
leave room for government intervention for either privatizing or shutting down the public ￿rm
(White, 2002). As this paper is intended to examine strategic interactions between ￿rms and
the emergence of R&D alliances, consideration of monopolistic public ￿rms or private markets
would not be relevant for our purposes. Note that the marginal cost of production is then
ci(g) = @Ci
@qi = (￿ c￿Ei)+2qi. Therefore, the impact of e⁄ective R&D on the margin is to induce a
downward shift in each ￿rm￿ s marginal cost curve without a⁄ecting its slope. This speci￿cation,
in a simple way, maintains the spirit of earlier contributions, all the while rendering their results
comparable with ours (d￿Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez, 2001;
Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007; Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch, 2008).
Furthermore, we postulate that the government subsidizes R&D e⁄ort. Speci￿cally, we
assume that each ￿rm receives a subsidy (tax if negative) s per unit of R&D e⁄ort, S(ei) = sei.13
As concerns private ￿rms, they are assumed to maximize own pro￿t
￿i(g) = [a ￿ qi(g) ￿
X
j6=i
qj(g)]qi(g) ￿ Ci(g) ￿ e2
i(g) + S(g), (3)
whereas the public ￿rm maximizes welfare de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus and producer
12White (2002) pointed out that this assumption can be quali￿ed in several ways. For instance, there is mixed
evidence on the relative e¢ ciency of public and private ￿rms, and so assuming that the public ￿rm is neither too
e¢ cient nor too ine¢ cient would seem quite reasonable. Furthermore, public ￿rms that survive for a signi￿cant
time period may fall within the same category of being relatively e¢ cient.
13It can be shown that the results are robust to the case of subsidizing R&D expenditure.







￿i(g) ￿ s[ei(g) + ej(g) + ek(g)]. (4)
The form of the public ￿rm￿ s objective function, placing equal weight on consumer and
producer surplus, accords with utilitarianism or doctrines aimed at promoting fairness among
consumers and producers. This is consistent with the purpose of this work which is to compare
individual incentives to form strategic alliances with the social ones. In other words, we intend
to examine the circumstances under which the presence of a public ￿rm can reconcile private
and social incentives for collaboration, which is clearly a normative question. We thus restrict
attention to an equally-weighted form of welfare function.14
Note further that the subsidization of R&D e⁄orts has no direct e⁄ect on welfare, because
simply the subsidy constitutes a transfer payment. However, there is an indirect and strategic
e⁄ect which is channeled to the public ￿rm￿ s R&D (and output) via the response of the private
￿rms to any change in the rate of subsidy. In that sense, an R&D subsidy serves, at least
partially, the same purpose as an output subsidy (White, 1996; Fjell and Heywood, 2004).







[(a ￿ qi(g) ￿
X
j6=i
qj(g))qi(g) ￿ Ci(g) ￿ e2
i(g)]. (5)
In our model, the role of an R&D subsidy is to address fundamental market failures that
induce sub-optimal levels of production. Since there are no costs associated with forming links,
the complete network corresponds to the ￿rst best. However, in the complete network an R&D
subsidy is needed for three main reasons. Firstly, a private ￿rm does not take into account
consumer surplus and so chooses a lower level of R&D relative the social optimum (so-called
undervaluation e⁄ect). Secondly, the objective of the public ￿rm, being consistent with welfare
maximization, takes into account consumer surplus but at the expense of introducing another
type of market failure ￿ine¢ ciency in production ￿which is related to the composition of R&D.
In addition, a further source of market failure arises due to the fact that ￿rms do not fully share
the outcomes of their research. Thus the role of an R&D subsidy is two-fold: to increase the
level of total R&D output and to re-distribute production from the less e¢ cient public ￿rm to
the more e¢ cient private ￿rms.15
14It is worth mentioning that the assumption of welfare maximization neglects any agency problems between
the government and the public ￿rm. However, this is an initial attempt at studying R&D networks with a public
￿rm, and in order to focus on the strategic interaction between public and private ￿rms, this assumption provides
a simple starting point for the analysis of more general cases. In this respect, we note that the literature on
mixed oligopoly has extensively used similar assumptions (see, for instance, Anderson et al., 1997; De Fraja and
Delbono, 1989; Pal and White, 1998; White, 2002; Fjell and Heywood, 2004).
15The assumption of decreasing returns to scale plays an apparent role here. Considering the cases of constant
or increasing returns to scale implies that welfare is maximized with a single public ￿rm. Thus the present as-
sumption of increasing marginal costs is necessary in order to focus on the important issues of strategic interaction
and R&D collaboration incentives among public and private ￿rms.
8The timing of moves. We construct a four-stage game: in stage one, ￿rms choose
simultaneously and independently their collaborative links. For tractability, it is assumed that
the formation of links incurs no additional costs to the parties involved (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzalez, 2001). In stage two, the government announces a level of R&D subsidy. Firms then
choose their individual R&D e⁄orts in the third stage. Finally, ￿rms compete in quantities. To
solve this multi-stage game we ￿rst obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of stages two to
four by backward induction. Next, we turn to stage one where we apply the notions of pairwise
stability and strong stability to obtain the Nash equilibria of this network formation game.
The theoretical framework proposed here relates ￿rms of di⁄erent ownership (private and
state-owned) with the implementation of an R&D subsidization policy. Thus, the seminal
contribution of Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2001) is enriched in three dimensions: (i) a public
￿rm maximizing its contribution to social surplus; (ii) an R&D policy instrument serving the
purpose of balancing the ine¢ cient distribution of production costs among the public and the
private ￿rms, as well as stimulating overall spending on R&D; (iii) the mode of knowledge
transmission, since we consider networks of both tacit and codi￿ed knowledge. Although these
considerations generate important interaction e⁄ects underlying the relationship between stable
and e¢ cient networks, they also complicate considerably the task of obtaining closed-form
solutions, and in particular concerning the cases of asymmetric network architectures, namely
the star and partial networks. However, we restrict attention to strategic alliances that will
endogenously emerge for given values of the spillover parameter (as in Song and Vannetelbosch,
2007). In particular, we consider the following four cases: (i) weak spillovers, ￿ = 1
4; medium
spillovers, ￿ = 1
2; strong spillovers, ￿ = 3
4; and perfect spillovers, ￿ = 1. The main reason behind
this selection of spillover levels is the fact that the di⁄erent network architectures become more
prominent for a relatively high spillover rate, prompting us to neglect the case of no spillovers.
As will be seen, the results on the stability and e¢ ciency properties of inter-￿rm collaborations
are clear-cut, which in turn leaves no room for the occurrence of potential irregularities.
3 Network formation
In this section we investigate ￿rms￿incentives to form bilateral collaborations with a view to
exchanging information on a cost reducing technology. We proceed ￿rst to derive the equi-
librium of the di⁄erent collaboration networks. Attempting to shed some light on the subtle
issues concerning strategic R&D alliances, we present here the public-hub star network. The
equilibrium solutions for the rest of the network architectures can be found in the Appendix.
Public-hub star network. The relevant cost structures under gs0 are
c0(gs0) = ￿ c￿e0￿￿(ei+ej)+2q0; ci(gs0) = ￿ c￿ei￿￿e0￿(￿=2)ej+2qi, i 6= j, i;j 2 f1;2g. (6)
Substituting these cost structures in (5) and (3), standard computations lead to the unique
9Nash equilibrium of the Cournot competition stage game
q0(e0;ei;ej) = [6(a ￿ ￿ c) + (10 ￿ 4￿)e0 + (9￿ ￿ 2)(ei + ej)]=26; (7)
qi(e0;ei;ej) = [12(a ￿ ￿ c) + (18￿ ￿ 6)e0 + (22 ￿ 8￿)ei + (5￿ ￿ 4)ej]=78: (8)
In stage three, each ￿rm selects a level of R&D e⁄ort to maximize its objective for a given
subsidy, anticipating perfectly the e⁄ects of its choice at the output selection stage. This yields
the following reaction functions
r0(ei;ej) =
(a ￿ ￿ c)(35 + 64￿) + C1(ei + ej)
271 + 64￿ ￿ 96￿2 ; (9)
ri(e0;ej) =
24(a ￿ ￿ c)(11 ￿ 4￿) + C2e0 + C3ej + 1521s
2558 + 352￿ ￿ 64￿2 ; (10)
where C1 = ￿16 + 107￿ ￿ 8￿2, C2 = ￿132 + 444￿ ￿ 144￿2 and C3 = ￿88 + 142￿ ￿ 40￿2.
We now make the following remarks on the externalities generated under the present net-
work: the R&D e⁄ort is a strategic substitute for su¢ ciently low spillover values, and turns
to a strategic complement whenever the spillover exceeds a certain threshold. Importantly, the
turning point from strategic substitution to strategic complementarity is lower from the public
￿rm￿ s viewpoint, enabling private ￿rms to enhance their own cost e¢ ciency to a greater extent
compared to the public ￿rm. Note that the associated spillover value is the solution to the
equation C1 = 0; and it can be computed as ￿ ’ 0:15. Similarly, the R&D e⁄ort is a strategic
substitute from a private ￿rm￿ s perspective in relation to the public ￿rm if and only if ￿ < 0:33;
however, the R&D e⁄ort with respect to the other private ￿rm remains a strategic substitute if
and only if ￿ < 0:8. Note that these critical values are the solutions to the equations C2 = 0,
C3 = 0, respectively. Thus, it is more likely that R&D is a strategic complement from the
viewpoint of the ￿hub￿￿rm.
Solving the system of the R&D reaction functions and applying symmetry for the ￿rms at
the spokes, i.e. ei = ej = e; we obtain
e0(s) = [(a ￿ ￿ c)(83 + 233￿ ￿ 12￿2) ￿ 3(16 ￿ 107￿ + 8￿2)s]=D; (11)
ei(s) = [4(a ￿ ￿ c)(33 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿2) + 3(271 + 64￿ ￿ 96￿2)s]=2D: (12)
where D = 703+265￿ ￿344￿2+16￿3. Note that the e⁄ect of the subsidy on the R&D e⁄ort of
a private ￿rm is positive, whereas the subsidy can exert either a positive or a negative in￿ uence
on the public ￿rm￿ s e⁄ort; the associated e⁄ect is positive if and only if ￿ > 0:15. The intuition
behind this pattern can be gained by referring to the subsidy induced movements of the R&D
best response functions, given by (9) and (10). Speci￿cally, when the spillover rate is relatively
low (￿ < 0:15) an increase in the amount of subsidy increases the R&D e⁄ort of each private
￿rm. This induces an outward shift of the private ￿rms￿best response functions (see eq. 10),
10implying a reduction in the public ￿rm￿ s R&D e⁄ort, provided that the best response functions
are downward sloping. When the spillover rate lies in the intermediate range (0:15 < ￿ < 0:33)
an increase in the amount of subsidy increases the private ￿rms￿R&D e⁄ort too, which has now
a positive rather than a negative impact on the public ￿rm￿ s e⁄ort, since R&D is a strategic
complement from the public ￿rm￿ s standpoint. Finally, when the spillover rate is relatively high
(￿ > 0:33), meaning that R&D e⁄orts are strategic complements, an increase of the subsidy
will always strengthen the ￿rms￿R&D e⁄orts.
In the second stage, the government chooses the level of subsidy to maximize welfare. The
unique Nash equilibrium of this stage game is16
s(gs0) = 2(6 + 145￿ + 109￿2 ￿ 60￿3)=3G; (13)
where G = 231 + 88￿ ￿ 240￿2 ￿ 16￿3 + 32￿4. Note also that the optimal subsidy is always
positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers. The latter may seem initially surprising, but
follows simply from the fact that a higher spillover rate increases the returns to the subsidy
concerning R&D e⁄orts of the network participants.
Substitutions reveal the Nash equilibrium solutions of the entire game, which are presented
in Table 2.
Hub ￿rm (public) Spoke ￿rms (private)
eh
0( gs0) = (27 + 72￿ + 22￿2 ￿ 24￿3)=G e(gs0) = (24 + 55￿ + 20￿2 ￿ 16￿3)=G
qh
0(gs0) = (60 + 52￿ ￿ 23￿2)=G q(gs0) = 13(6 + 4￿ ￿ 3￿2)=2G
￿h
0(gs0) = ￿1=3G2 ￿(gs0) = ￿2=6G2
W(gs0) = (75 + 56￿ ￿ 34￿2)=G CS(gs0) = 2(69 + 52￿ ￿ 31￿2)2=G2
Table 2: Equilibrium solutions in the public-hub star network
Note that the superscript h refers to the hub ￿rm, and the expressions for ￿1 and ￿2
are given by ￿1 = 8937 + 15750￿ + 7746￿2 + 5756￿3 ￿ 301￿4 ￿ 4704￿5 + 1152￿6 > 0 and
￿2 = 15372 + 23736￿ + 8794￿2 + 8676￿3 ￿ 1037￿4 ￿ 7936￿5 + 2304￿6 > 0.
3.1 R&D e⁄orts
We begin our analysis by addressing the following question: What is the impact of forming links
on the ￿rms￿R&D e⁄ort? Would an increase in the number of strategic alliances increase own
R&D e⁄ort, or would it induce a reduction of the e⁄ort due to free-riding? The answer to these
questions is summarised in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 (a) The public ￿rm￿ s R&D e⁄ort increases in the following cases:
(i) with the number of own links, e0(ge) < el
0(gp0) < eh
0(gs0);
(ii) with the degree of R&D spillovers;
(iii) when private ￿rms establish links.
16Since the term a ￿ ￿ c has no in￿ uence on the results we can set it equal to 1.
11The exception is the private-partial network, gp, in which the public ￿rm￿ s R&D e⁄ort
decreases with the spillover,
@e0(gp)
@￿ < 0, and with the addition of a link among the private ￿rms
in an empty network, e0(ge) > e0(gp).
(b) Each private ￿rm￿ s R&D e⁄ort increases with the number of own links, with the degree
of R&D spillovers, as well as when the other private ￿rm establishes collaboration links with the
public ￿rm.
As concerns the public ￿rm, it appears that an additional R&D partnership induces a greater
R&D e⁄ort. This highlights the combined e⁄ect underlying direct and indirect spillovers. Specif-
ically, in the move from the empty to the public partial network, the public ￿rm can bene￿t from
direct spillovers. By moving then to the public-hub star network the public ￿rm can appropriate
technological know-how not only through direct but also through indirect collaborations, which
in turn increases overall returns to R&D (see Figure 2 and Table 3). This explains why the










Figure 2: Network architectures when the public ￿rm adds own links
In contrast, when private ￿rms form R&D partnerships, this shapes the public ￿rm￿ s in-
centives according to the level of collaborative activity. In the most interesting case, when the
private ￿rms enter into a collaborative agreement ￿thus forming the private-partial network
￿this implies that the public ￿rm reduces its R&D e⁄ort compared to the case of the empty
network. This outcome is mainly explained by the large disparities resulting from a situation
in which the public ￿rm remains isolated, since its market share becomes smaller. In all other
cases, it can be checked that an increase in inter-￿rm partnering activity induces the public ￿rm
to exert a higher R&D e⁄ort. The same pattern is true concerning the relationship between





4 .194 .193 .172 .154 .108 .117
￿ = 1
2 .326 .305 .260 .200 .094 .117
￿ = 3
4 .630 .503 .417 .259 .071 .117
￿ = 1 2.415 1.021 .836 .345 .027 .117
Table 3: Public ￿rm￿ s R&D e⁄ort
As concerns private ￿rms, we ￿nd that in all cases the interaction e⁄ects underlying R&D
e⁄ort and the level of collaborative activity are positive. The possible network architectures are
shown in Figure 3. Furthermore, we obtain that an increase in the ￿ ow of technological know-
how increases R&D e⁄orts of the private ￿rms. To see intuitively why this happens, notice that
the public ￿rm is an aggressive competitor since it expands its output more than a private ￿rm
￿and thus it reduces the rents available in the product market. Seen from another perspective,
a mixed oligopoly is more competitive market than a fully private one, as it exhibits a lower
price and higher level of social welfare. It follows that private ￿rms can increase their payo⁄
by increasing R&D e⁄ort (with the rate of spillover) in order to counter the negative e⁄ects













Figure 3: Network architectures when private ￿rm 1 adds own links
Finally, concerning the relationship between R&D partnering activity (number of links)
and technological spillovers we ￿nd the presence of positive interaction e⁄ects underlying it.
This result is in sharp contrast with earlier contributions studying R&D collaboration between
private ￿rms, which found that in most cases an increase in the level of collaborative activity
or an increase in the degree of spillovers lead to a reduction in the ￿rms￿R&D e⁄ort due to
the associated incentives for free-riding (Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez, 2001; Mauleon, Sempere-
Monerris and Vannetelbosch, 2008).
13gc gs0 gs gp0 gp ge
e e e eh e el el e
￿ = 1
4 :184 :163 .172 :172 :121 :122 :144 :104
￿ = 1
2 :318 :253 :271 :272 :142 :146 :200 :104
￿ = 3
4 :624 :422 :450 :451 :166 :180 :283 :104
￿ = 1 2:415 :874 :902 :908 :199 :229 :432 :104
Table 4: Private ￿rms￿R&D e⁄ort
3.2 Stability and e¢ ciency
3.2.1 Pairwise stability
R&D alliances are conceptualized in terms of pairwise links which are embedded in a more
general context of bilateral relations ￿a network. Thus, to address the issue of network for-
mation, one can use the de￿nition of pairwise stability to examine which network architectures
will endogenously emerge. The de￿nition is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and refers
to the ￿rms￿incentives to altering the structure of a network by creating or severing bilateral
links. This de￿nition is quite weak and should therefore be seen only as a necessary condition
for strategic stability.
De￿nition 1 A network g is pairwise stable if the following conditions are satis￿ed:
(i) If ￿rms i; j 2 N are private, a network g is pairwise stable whenever
(a) for all ij 2 g, ￿i(g) ￿ ￿i(g ￿ ij) and ￿j(g) ￿ ￿j(g ￿ ij), and
(b) for all ij = 2 g, if ￿i(g) < ￿i(g + ij), then ￿j(g) > ￿j(g + ij).
(ii) If ￿rm i is public and ￿rm j is private, a network g is pairwise stable whenever
(a) for all ij 2 g, W(g) ￿ W(g ￿ ij) and ￿j(g) ￿ ￿j(g ￿ ij), and
(b) for all ij = 2 g, if W(g) < W(g + ij), then ￿j(g) > ￿j(g + ij) (and vice versa).
The de￿nition of Jackson and Holinsky (1996) is adapted to allow for a public ￿rm as a
member of a network. This de￿nition says that a network is pairwise stable if it survives all
possible deviations at a bilateral level, that is, if no ￿rm has an incentive to delete one of their
links, and no other two ￿rms want to add a new link, with one bene￿ting strictly and the other
at least weakly. Thus, joint consent is required in order to establish a bilateral relationship,
i.e. a link cannot be enforced; and a link can be simply deleted unilaterally. We apply this
de￿nition to study pairwise stable networks.
Proposition 2 In the presence of a public ￿rm, the unique pairwise stable collaboration network
is the complete network.
14The stability properties of the di⁄erent research networks can be analysed by referring to
Table 4. It appears that in the empty, partial and star networks ￿rms that are not connected
have an incentive to establish a new collaboration tie between them. Interestingly, in the private
partial network, in which there is a collaborative agreement between the private ￿rms whereas
the public ￿rm is isolated, it turns out that each private ￿rm has an incentive to set up a new
link with the public ￿rm in order to become the ￿hub￿in the resulting private-hub star network.
This is in contrast with the outcome of a purely private market where the partial network
remains stable for large spillovers and no subsidies to R&D (Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez, 2001).
When R&D subsidies are available, the partially connected network is stable for intermediate
spillovers (Song and Vannetelbosch, 2007). The intuition behind these results stems from the
large disparities, and the consequent cost advantage of the liked ￿rms compared to the isolated
one; in extreme cases, the isolated ￿rm can be driven out of the market altogether. By contrast,
when a public ￿rm is isolated, then each linked ￿rm has an incentive to establish a new con-
necting link with the public ￿rm, leading to the private-hub star network. The reason why each
private ￿rm bene￿ts from such collaboration is that the public ￿rm invests a larger amount in
R&D than each private ￿rm, so that setting up a new connecting link enables each private ￿rm
to increase its payo⁄ through direct spillovers from the public ￿rm as well as from its current
partner. This in turn destabilises the private partial network, gp.
By the same token, in the private-hub star network, the private ￿rm at one of the spokes
has an incentive to establish a new link with the public ￿rm; this gives rise to the complete
network provided that the public ￿rm always bene￿ts from an additional collaboration.
Next, consider the public-hub star network. In this situation, the private ￿rms have an
incentive to link to each other in order to diminish the competitive advantage of the ￿hub￿ .
This in turn destabilises the public-hub star network, giving rise to the complete network. Note
that these results are consistent with the case in which all ￿rms are private, since the complete
network remains always pairwise stable.
Our ￿nal observation concerns the role of spillovers in the stability of the complete net-
work. Note that the relevant network architectures become more prominent when technological
spillovers are large enough. By contrast, in the limiting case that the spillover tends to zero, the
network architectures become very similar. Thus, as spillovers become smaller this decreases
the (potential) losses from deleting a link from the complete network (and in that sense the
complete network becomes more vulnerable).
gc gs0 gs gp0 gp ge
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿l ￿l ￿
￿ = 1
4 :075 :065 :067 :073 :047 :056 :062 :048
￿ = 1
2 :158 :109 :116 :136 :046 :070 :088 :048
￿ = 3
4 :518 :244 :260 :326 :045 :094 :146 :048
￿ = 1 7:16 :922 :938 1:24 :046 :140 :294 :048
Table 5: Private ￿rms￿pro￿t
153.2.2 Strong stability
We proceed to perform an additional check for stability by resorting to the notion of strong
stability due to Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). This notion of stability refers to
the incentives of a coalition of ￿rms to redistribute their collaboration links, and so it allows
for situations which are not accounted for under pairwise stability. In that sense the current
de￿nition constitutes a powerful re￿nement of pairwise stability as it allows for more than a
single pair of ￿rms to deviate and reorganise their links. This is particularly useful because it
could be the case that a group of ￿rms are better o⁄ by deleting or adding several links, which
is not being taken into account when studying pairwise stable networks. Indeed, we will say
that a network g is strongly stable when it survives all possible changes in the number of its
links by a coalition of agents. Let us ￿rst explain what is meant by ￿ reorganisation￿of the links
in network g by a coalition of agents S.
De￿nition 2 A network ￿ g 2 G is obtainable from g 2 G via deviations by S if
(i) ij 2 ￿ g and ij = 2 g implies ij ￿ S, and
(ii) ij 2 g and ij = 2 ￿ g implies ij \ S 6= ?.
This de￿nition re￿ ects two main ideas. First, a link is formed between members of a coalition
S (condition (i)). Second, if a link is deleted, it must be the case that at least one of the ￿rms
who deleted their link be in S (condition (ii)). Besides, consent of two ￿rms is required for a link
to be formed (i.e. a link cannot be enforced), but a link can be simply severed unilaterally. The
latter requirements apply to the de￿nition of pairwise stability as well. Thus pairwise stability
can be seen as a special case of strong stability when S is singleton.
Next, building on de￿nition 2, we present the de￿nition of strong stability due to Jackson
and van den Nouweland (2005). This has been slightly adapted to allow for a public ￿rm as a
member of a network.
De￿nition 3 A network g is strongly stable if the following conditions hold:
(i) If ￿rms i and j are private a network g is strongly stable if
for any S ￿ N, ￿ g that is obtainable from g via deviations by S, and i 2 S such that
￿i(￿ g) > ￿i(g), there exists j 2 S such that ￿j(￿ g) < ￿j(g).
(ii) If ￿rm i is public and ￿rm j is private a network g is strongly stable if
for any S ￿ N, ￿ g that is obtainable from g via deviations by S, and i 2 S such that
W(￿ g) > W(g), there exists j 2 S such that ￿j(￿ g) < ￿j(g) (and vice versa).
Note that since the notion of strong stability considers deviations by a coalition of ￿rms,
it also presumes some sort of coordination among them. In this respect, it is a more suitable
notion for smaller network architectures, so that it can be used to study R&D networks in mixed
oligopoly. Applying de￿nition 3, we can state the following result.
16Proposition 3 The unique strongly stable network of collaboration is the complete network.
The only candidate for strongly stable network is the complete network, since the notion of
strong stability constitutes a re￿nement of pairwise stability. The cases that emerge here are
the following: (i) the coalition of the two private ￿rms deleting their links with the public ￿rm,
thus forming the private partial network, gp; (ii) the coalition of the public ￿rm and one private
￿rm severing their link with the other private ￿rm in order to form the public partial network,
gp0; and the coalition of all ￿rms deleting their connecting links to establish the empty network,
ge. It turns out none of these deviations is pro￿table (for the coalition of agents attempting to
alter the structure of the complete network).
Intuitively, the asymmetries in the partially connected networks are considerably reduced in
the presence of a public ￿rm, as we mentioned previously (in relation to the discussion of Propo-
sition 2). This makes the private partial and public partial networks vulnerable in the sense that
￿rms have incentives to form additional collaborative alliances. Interestingly, the incentives of
the private ￿rms to form additional collaborations stem from the adverse consequences of the
public ￿rm￿ s behaviour on their market share and pro￿ts. The same reasoning applies to the
empty network in which the level of partnering activity is minimal. Thus the presence of a
public ￿rm increases the degree of partnering intensity, so that the complete network becomes
the unique pairwise stable as well as strongly stable network. In large part, this is due to the
maximizing behaviour of public ￿rm which suppresses the pro￿ts of private ￿rms, rather than
due to any enhancing e⁄ect of public ownership on the private ￿rms￿incentives to collaborate.
This result sharply contrasts with the outcome of a purely private market. Indeed, when all
￿rms are pro￿t-maximizers and the government does not subsidize R&D output, the partially
connected network is the unique strongly stable network if and only if spillovers are su¢ ciently
small (Song and Vannetelbsoch, 2007).17 When subsidies to R&D become available, the partially
connected network remains stable against deviations by a coalition of agents if and only if
spillovers obtain intermediate values (Song and Vannetelbsoch, 2007). In contrast, we have
shown that in a mixed market the partially connected network is no longer pairwise stable, and
so it cannot be strongly stable too; instead, ￿rms have incentives to connect to each other in
order to form the complete network.
3.2.3 Aggregate performance
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the di⁄erent network structures in terms of
consumer surplus, total pro￿ts and e⁄ective R&D. As concerns consumer surplus, we obtain
that it increases with the level of collaborative activity as well as with the degree of technological
spillovers, so it attains its maximum under the complete network (see Table 6). The only
exception to this pattern is the public partial network which lowers consumer welfare compared
17Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2001) characterized pairwise stable networks both for the three-￿rm case and
for symmetric networks with an arbitrary number of ￿rms, although a complete characterization in the latter
case turns out to be not entirely feasible.
17to the private partial network when spillovers are large, ￿ 2 (3
4;1). We now explain the reason:
note that in the public partial network the public ￿rm takes into account not only the pro￿ts of
its partner but also the pro￿ts of the isolated ￿rm. This in turn implies that when spillovers are
large the two ￿rms which are connected under the private partial network are more aggressive
competitors than the two partners ￿public and private ￿under the public partial network.
Indeed, the two private ￿rms together exert a greater R&D e⁄ort, which o⁄sets the reduction
in the R&D output of the isolated public ￿rm ￿and thus the private partial network expands
total output and increases consumer surplus.
CS(gc) CS(gs0) CS(gs) CS(gp0) CS(gp) CS(ge)
￿ = 1
4 .238 .227 .224 .195 .191 .178
￿ = 1
2 .390 .329 .320 .219 .213 .178
￿ = 3
4 .954 .600 .568 .254 .250 .178
￿ = 1 9.85 1.795 1.610 .312 .329 .178
Table 6: Consumer surplus
Turning to the comparison of total pro￿ts, we obtain that they increase both with respect
to the number of collaborative alliances and with the spillover parameter, which again implies
that they are maximized under the complete network (see Table 7). Interestingly, the private
partial and private-hub star networks dominate respectively the public partial and public-hub
star ones. Taken in conjunction with our ￿ndings for consumer surplus, these results suggest
that the aggregate performance of di⁄erent networks in terms of pro￿t does not always tend to
go hand-in-hand with their performance in terms of consumer surplus. Thus it is important to
evaluate the di⁄erent networks by resorting to the measure of overall e¢ ciency from the point
of view of the society at large, namely societal welfare.
￿(gc) ￿(gs0) ￿(gs) ￿(gp0) ￿(gp) ￿(ge)
￿ = 1
4 .234 .209 .217 .166 .181 .152
￿ = 1
2 .490 .357 .381 .190 .234 .152
￿ = 3
4 1.591 .811 .865 .230 .341 .152
￿ = 1 21.89 3.112 3.170 .305 .613 .152
Table 7: Total pro￿ts
In a similar way, total e⁄ective R&D increases both with the number of links and the
degree of spillovers, and so it is maximized under the complete network, gc. Interestingly, the
private partial network generates greater overall reduction of the marginal cost compared with
the public partial network. However, comparison of the public-hub star and private-hub star
networks reveals that the former always outperforms the latter. Thus, the presence of a public
￿rm in the role of a ￿hub￿ leads to greater reduction in costs and improvements in market
performance.
18E(gc) E(gs0) E(gs) E(gp0) E(gp) E(ge)
￿ = 1
4 .845 .738 .731 .467 .468 .325
￿ = 1
2 1.922 1.497 1.469 .661 .691 .325
￿ = 3
4 4.697 3.051 2.967 .935 1.061 .325
￿ = 1 21.73 7.432 7.068 1.348 1.757 .325
Table 8: Total e⁄ective R&D
3.2.4 E¢ ciency
We now study social welfare under the di⁄erent networks. We say that a network g 2 G is
e¢ cient if W(g) ￿ W(￿ g) for all ￿ g ￿ G. Our ￿rst result concerns welfare under the partial
networks. When spillovers are small (￿ = 1
4), the public partial network increases overall
welfare compared to the private partial network. Thus, it turns out that for small values of the
spillover parameter the increase in consumer surplus under the public partial network dominates
the decrease in total pro￿ts, leading to an expansion of societal welfare. The outcome is reversed
for medium, large and perfect spillover values.
W(gc) W(gs0) W(gs) W(gp0) W(gp) W(ge)
￿ = 1
4 .375 .365 .364 .339 .338 .325
￿ = 1
2 .480 .440 .436 .358 .359 .325
￿ = 3
4 .751 .592 .582 .386 .394 .325
￿ = 1 2.41 1.02 .982 .429 .459 .325
Table 9: Welfare levels
The next result pertains to the relationship between social welfare and the level of inter-￿rm
partnering activity (number of links), on the one hand, and the extent of technological know-
how transmission on the other (see Table 9). In all cases, the level of collaborative activity as
well as the degree of spillovers has a positive impact on overall welfare. We are now in position
to state the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The complete network is the unique e¢ cient network. In addition, social wel-
fare increases with the degree of spillovers, and with the number of collaborative links, namely
the complete network (gc) dominates the star networks (gs0, gs), the star networks dominate
the partial networks (gp0, gp), and the partial networks dominate the empty one (ge).
Taken together with our ￿ndings on the stability properties of the di⁄erent networks the
present result carries an important message: it suggests that the presence of a public ￿rm among
the network participants may reconcile individual incentives to form R&D collaborations with
the collective ones. Such a con￿ ict for a private market would occur for large spillover values
provided that spillovers concern codi￿ed knowledge and there are no subsidies to R&D output.
However, when subsidies to R&D are available, a con￿ ict would only arise when spillovers are
very small or quite large. Our study investigated the possibility of eliminating the con￿ ict
19between stable and e¢ cient networks, and found that the presence of a public ￿rm among the
market participants (perhaps after nationalising a private ￿rm) may serve this purpose. Thus
the present result advocates against the widespread adoption of privatization programs, since
that would potentially have adverse consequences on the formation of R&D alliances that are
of optimal size from a social welfare point of view.
s(gc) s(gs0) s(gs) s(gp0) s(gp) s(ge)
￿ = 1
4 .173 .135 .148 .056 .086 .017
￿ = 1
2 .416 .305 .330 .102 .178 .017
￿ = 3
4 .955 .608 .646 .162 .310 .017
￿ = 1 4.049 1.404 1.436 .244 .541 .017
Table 10: R&D subsidies
Finally, we examine R&D subsidies under the di⁄erent networks. It appears that a higher
degree of partnering activity or degree of spillover increases the returns to R&D, which in
turn mandates a higher subsidy to R&D output. In addition, the public-hub star network is
subsidized more heavily than the private-hub star one. This is perhaps a consequence of the
fact that the public-hub star network yields lower levels of R&D investment. Notice, ￿nally,
that the public partial network is subsidized to a lesser extent compared with the private partial
one, although the latter leads to a greater reduction in marginal costs.
4 Modelling extensions
4.1 More than three ￿rms
There is broad agreement that the analysis of asymmetric networks is very complicated. To
overcome this obstacle, previous authors have concentrated on a three-￿rm oligopoly. Con-
cerning symmetric networks where each ￿rm has the same number of links the analysis can
be more fruitful, although a complete characterization of stable networks is again not entirely
feasible.18 This has been pointed out by Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2001) and Mauleon,
Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2008), among others. However, the simple setting em-
ployed here allows us to draw conjectures about the network architectures that one might expect
to emerge.
First, the empty network cannot be stable since any two ￿rms have an incentive to establish
a new collaboration. Second, it might appear that most of the collaborative alliances are formed
between the public ￿rm and private ones. This is because the public ￿rm invests a larger amount
in R&D than each private ￿rm. Thus, we would expect to observe networks of collaboration
having the public ￿rm as a central node. Third, the presence of a public ￿rm reduces the
asymmetries between linked ￿rms and the isolated one in the context of a three-￿rm oligopoly.
18The assumption of an equal number of links per ￿rm would undoubtedly be restrictive in the context of
competition between state-owned and private ￿rms.
20In a more general setting, we would expect to observe that the smaller the number of private
￿rms, the stronger is the in￿ uence of the public ￿rm in reducing the competitive advantage of
￿rms with a large number of links compared to the ￿rms with a smaller number of partners.
Seen from another perspective, the larger the number of public ￿rms in a given industry, the
more symmetric network structures one might expect to observe. These conjectures also present
hypotheses that could be empirically tested.
4.2 The mode of knowledge transmission
The aim of this subsection is to see whether our results will still hold in the context of codi￿ed
knowledge only. In this case, it is assumed that a ￿rm can fully absorb knowledge spillovers
from its direct partners. In addition, unconnected ￿rms receive public spillovers, implying that
a network consists only of direct alliances. Thus, given a network g and a collection of R&D
e⁄orts fei(g)gi2N, the e⁄ective R&D of ￿rm i is a follows







where Ni(g) is the number of links of ￿rm i in network g:
This framework was proposed in the seminal work of Goyal and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2001).
The main di⁄erence with the preceding formulation, as would be expected, is that the pat-
tern of both tacit and codi￿ed knowledge transmission places more emphasis on the role of
a network. In other words, when codi￿ed knowledge is relevant indirectly connected ￿rms as
well as unconnected ￿rms are treated alike, since they receive the same public spillover. In
contrast, the pattern of both tacit and codi￿ed knowledge transmission distinguishes between
direct and indirect partners, and it takes public spillovers to be negligible ￿thus making the
role of a network more prominent (see Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch, 2008).
The computational details are similar under both speci￿cations and are available for the author
upon request. It turns out that the role of a public ￿rm in balancing the market forces and re-
ducing large disparities is present independently of the mode of knowledge transmission. Thus,
although initially di⁄erent, both formulations deliver the same results concerning the stability
and e¢ ciency properties of R&D networks.
5 Conclusion
A well-established result is that private ￿rms do often underinvest in R&D activities due to
a lack of full appropriability of the returns to R&D. Previous authors examined the role of a
public ￿rm in regulating innovative activity. Our approach extended these studies by o⁄ering a
more comprehensive view of innovative activity in that it allowed the strategic e⁄ects of R&D to
be mediated through a network of R&D collaboration. This is important because the strategic
incentives to invest in R&D are shaped within the network of collaboration where ￿rms are
21embedded. Similar situations, in which the individual incentives to collaborate in R&D are
weaker than the collective ones, have been pointed out in the context of oligopolistic (network)
industries with private ￿rms only.
In this paper, we showed that a state-owned ￿rm may enhance the innovation process and
in turn improve market structure and industry performance. This is merely due to the public
￿rm￿ s maximizing behaviour, which leaves a small residual demand to the private ￿rms, rather
than a result of any enhancing e⁄ect of public ownership on the private ￿rms￿incentives to
collaborate. By forming collaboration ties the private ￿rms can, at least partially, counter this
depressing e⁄ect on their pro￿ts. Thus, the complete network endogenously emerges as the
unique stable network. From the point of view of the society at large, it turns out that the
complete network maximizes overall welfare.
What are the policy implications of the analysis? A public ￿rm can potentially be used as a
policy instrument in tackling the con￿ ict between stable and e¢ cient networks. However, we be-
lieve that the role of a public ￿rm in restoring the correct incentives for R&D collaboration would
be more e⁄ective the smaller the size and/or competitiveness of the relevant market. Moreover,
the fact that a public ￿rm encourages R&D collaboration and promotes R&D spending, helps
to overcoming the so-called underinvestment problem. However, this introduces another type of
market failure since the distribution of production costs is not e¢ cient. Thus, a public ￿rm may
be a useful policy instrument, although with certain limitations. A future promising research
direction is to empirically investigate the relationship between network architectures and the
presence of state-owned ￿rms.
6 Appendix
We present the equilibrium computations for the complete, private-hub star, public partial,
private partial and empty networks.
A1. The complete network
Under this network architecture, gc, all ￿rms are connected with one another. Standard
computations reveal that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium R&D e⁄orts, quantities, pro￿ts,
subsidy, consumer surplus and welfare are
e0(gc) = (27 + 64￿ + 24￿2 ￿ 16￿3)=F e(gc) = (24 + 67￿ + 24￿2 ￿ 16￿3)=F
q0(gc) = 6(10 + 6￿ ￿ 3￿2)=F q(gc) = 13(3 + 2￿ ￿ ￿2)=F
￿0(gc) = E1=3F2 ￿(gc) = E2=3F2
s(gc) = 2(6 + 187￿ + 114￿2 ￿ 58￿3)=3F CS(gc) = 2(69 + 44￿ ￿ 22￿2F)2=F2
W(gc) = 3(25 + 16￿ ￿ 8￿2)=F ￿(gc) = E3=F2
Table 11: Nash equilibrium solutions for the complete network
where
22E1 = 8937 + 13458￿ + 11612￿2 + 9732￿3 ￿ 2548￿4 ￿ 4128￿5 + 1088￿6,
E2 = 7686 + 12300￿ + 11867￿2 + 9876￿3 ￿ 2566￿4 ￿ 4128￿5 + 1088￿6,
E3 = 8103 + 12686￿ + 11782￿2 + 9828￿3 ￿ 2560￿4 ￿ 4128￿5 + 1088￿5,
F = 231 + 48￿ ￿ 238￿2 ￿ 32￿3 + 32￿4:
A2. The private-hub star network
In the private-hub star network, gs, a private ￿rm is at the hub and is connected with the
other two ￿rms. As for the spoke ￿rms each has a collaboration link with the hub and there
is no direct link among them, although they are indirectly connected through the hub ￿rm.
Under the present network architecture it turns out that the asymmetries between ￿rms are
relatively pronounced, so that we cannot obtain closed-form solutions. However, for the rest of
the analysis we restrict attention to speci￿c spillover values: ￿ = 1
4, ￿ = 1
2, ￿ = 3
4 and ￿ = 1.
The resulting Nash equilibrium solutions are placed at the main body of the paper.
A3. The public partial network
In the public partial network, gp0, the public ￿rm and a private one maintain a single
collaborative agreement, while the remaining private ￿rm stays isolated. As in the case of the
private hub-star network, we resort to speci￿c values of the spillover parameter, i.e. ￿ = 1
4,
￿ = 1
2, ￿ = 3
4 and ￿ = 1. The Nash equilibrium solutions are reported at the main text.
A4. The private partial network
In the private partial network, gp, there is a research collaboration between the two private
￿rms, while the public ￿rm remains outside the collaboration. The Nash equilibrium solutions
of this game are
Linked ￿rms (private)
el(gp) = 24(1 + ￿)=H ql(gp) = 39=H
￿l(gp) = 6(427 + 48￿ + 128￿2)=H2
Isolated ￿rm (public)
e0(gp) = (27 ￿ 16￿ ￿ 8￿2)=H
q0(gp) = 4(15 ￿ 8￿ ￿ 4￿2)=H
￿0(gp) = (2979 ￿ 1528￿ ￿ 1648￿2 + 320￿3 + 192￿4)=H2
s(gp) = 4(1 + 14￿)=H
￿(gp) = (8103 ￿ 952￿ ￿ 112￿2 + 320￿3 + 192￿4)=H2
CS (gp) = 2(69 ￿ 16￿ ￿ 8￿2)2=H2
W(gp) = (75 ￿ 16￿ ￿ 8￿2)=H
Table 12: Nash equilibrium solutions for the private partial network
where H = 231 ￿ 80￿ ￿ 40￿2.
23A5. The empty network
In the empty network, ge, there are no collaboration ties. Then one can easily obtain
the Nash equilibrium solutions for the empty network structure. These are presented in the
following Table.
e0(gc) = 9=77 e(gc) = 8=77
q0(gc) = 20=77 q(gc) = 13=77
￿0(gc) = 331=5929 ￿(gc) = 122=2541
s(gc) = 4=231 CS(gc) = 1058=5929
W(gc) = 25=77 ￿(gc) = 2701=17787
Table 13: Nash equilibrium solutions for the empty network
A6. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: We ￿rst show that the complete network gc is pairwise stable.
The stability conditions i(b) and (ii)b are trivially satis￿ed since no links can be added to the
complete network. Here there are two cases to be considered. First, we show that the pair of
private ￿rms i and k has no incentive to delete their link (condition i(a)). Note that if the ￿rms
do so, the resulting network of collaboration will be the public-hub star network, gs0. To prove
our claim, we have to establish the relationship ￿(gc) > ￿(gs0). Notice that the subscripts are
dropped due to symmetry, i.e. ￿i(gc) = ￿k(gc) = ￿(gc). Using table 5, it can be easily seen
that ￿(gc) > ￿(gs0), which implies that condition i(a) is satis￿ed.
We now turn to show that the stability condition ii(a) is satis￿ed. This condition says that
the public ￿rm j and a private ￿rm, say k without loss of generality, are better o⁄by not severing
their link. Notice that the resulting network when ￿rms j and k break their collaboration tie is
the private-hub star network, gs, with ￿rm k being a ￿spoke￿in gs. We prove our claim using
tables 5 and 9. Then it is easily established that W(gc) > W(gs) and ￿(gc) > ￿(gs). Therefore,
we have shown that the complete network of collaboration is pairwise stable. This also proves
that the star networks (public-hub star and private-hub star) are not pairwise stable.
We show next that the empty network is not pairwise stable. The stability conditions i(a)
and ii(a) are trivially satis￿ed because there are no links to be deleted in the empty network.
However, condition i(b) is not satis￿ed for the empty network since the private ￿rms have an
incentive to form a link. To see this, note from table 5 that ￿(ge) < ￿l(gp). This su¢ ces
to establish that the empty network is not pairwise stable. Alternatively, one can show that
condition ii(b) is violated because the public ￿rm and a private ￿rm have an incentive to form
a collaboration tie, i.e. W(ge) < W(gp0) and ￿(ge) < ￿l(gp0).
The next step is to show that the partial networks are not pairwise stable. Notice that
conditions i(a) and ii(a) are satis￿ed because no pair of ￿rms wants to sever their link. (This
follows from the proof that the empty network is not stable.) Thus it remains to show that
either condition i(b) or ii(b) is not ful￿lled so that the partial networks are not stable. We begin
24to show this for the private partial network, gp. The relevant condition here is ii(b). That is, a
private ￿rm, say ￿rm i without loss of generality, and the public ￿rm j = 0 are better o⁄ by
forming a collaboration tie, with ￿rm i being a ￿hub￿in the resulting private-hub star network,
gs (violation of condition ii(b)). From tables 5 and 9, it can be seen that W(gs) > W(gp) and
￿h(gs) > ￿l(gp). Thus the private partial network is not stable.
Finally, we show that the public partial network gp0 is not pairwise stable. The relevant
conditions here are i(b) and ii(b). Thus it su¢ ces to show that any condition is violated for
the public partial network to be unstable. Considering the incentives of the non-linked private
￿rm, say k without loss of generality, and the public ￿rm j = 0 to form a connecting link we
have that W(gp0) < W(gs0) and ￿(gp0) < ￿(gs0), with ￿rm k being a ￿spoke￿in the resulting
public-hub star network, gs0. This constitutes a violation of condition ii(b) for stability, and
in turn, establishes our claim. One can show instead that condition i(b) is violated, because
￿h(gs) > ￿l(gp0) and ￿(gs) > ￿(gp0). The proof is now complete. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Note ￿rst that strong stability is a re￿nement of pairwise stability
and therefore the only candidate for a strongly stable network is the complete network, gc.
Consider the case that the coalition of the private ￿rms sever the link with the public ￿rm
(i.e. we check stability condition (i)). If the private ￿rms will do so, the resulting network
of collaboration is the private partial network, gp. The private ￿rms will have an incentive to
delete their links with the public ￿rm if and only if ￿i(gc) < ￿l
i(gp) and ￿k(gc) < ￿l
k(gp). The
subscripts can be dropped due to symmetry and so the condition ￿(gc) < ￿l(gp) need only hold
(for the complete network to be unstable). As in the proof of Proposition 2, we compare the
expressions for pro￿ts ￿(gc) and ￿l(gp) by resorting to table 5. Inspection of table 5 indicates
that ￿(gc) > ￿l(gp): Hence, condition (i) is satis￿ed.
Next we check the stability condition (ii). Indeed we check whether the coalition of the
public ￿rm j = 0 and a private ￿rm, say i without loss of generality, have an incentive to delete
their existing link with the private ￿rm k. The resulting network of collaboration from deletion
of these links is the public partial network, gp0. We use again tables 5 and 9 for our comparisons.
It follows that W(gc) > W(gp0) and ￿(gc) > ￿l(gp0), and hence condition (ii) is satis￿ed.
Finally, we show that when S ￿ N the complete network remains strongly stable. In other
words, we show that the coalition of the public and the two private ￿rms have no incentives
to break their ties to form the empty network. Indeed we have that W(gc) > W(ge) and
￿(gc) > ￿(ge). Since the complete network, gc; survives all possible deviations by a coalition of
players, it follows that gc is the (unique) strongly stable collaboration network. Q.E.D.
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